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The preferred Western model for science governance has come to involve attending to the perspectives
of the public. In practice, however, this model has been criticised for failing to promote democracy along
participatory lines. We argue that contemporary approaches to science policy making demonstrate less
the failure of democracy and more the success of liberal modes of government in adapting to meet new
governance challenges. Using a case study of recent UK policy debates on scientiﬁc work mixing human
and animal biological material, we show ﬁrst how a ‘moral economy’ is brought into being as a regulatory
domain and second how this domain is governed to align cultural with scientiﬁc values. We suggest that
it is through these practices that the state assures its aspirations for enhancing individual and collective
prosperity through technological advance are met.
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Reﬂecting on science governance in its 2000 White Paper
Excellence and Opportunity: a science and innovation policy for the
21st century, the Department of Trade and Industry observes that
Science is too important to be left only to scientists. Their
knowledge, and their assessment of risks, is only one dimension
of the challenge for society. When science raises profound
ethical and social issues, the whole of society needs to take part
in the debate. (DTI, 2000: 54)
The DTI was acknowledging that in the wake of very public
controversies over science in the 1980s and 90s, including the
response to genetically modiﬁed (GM) crops and the bovine
spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) crisis, the preferred Western
model for good science policy making could no longer rely exclu-
sively on expert advisory committees but must include attendance
to the perspectives of the public. This model has been given intel-
lectual foundations by work in the sociology of science and
normative credentials by the promotion of deliberative models of
democracy. However, the manner in which the model has been put
into practice in science governance has been criticised forvey), brian.g.salter@kcl.ac.uk
 license.neglecting the promotion of democracy along participatory lines.
This paper argues that contemporary approaches to science
governance demonstrate less the failure of democracy and more
the success of liberal modes of government in adapting to meet
new governance challenges.
A good deal of the work in science studies that has addressed
the relations between scientiﬁc knowledge and political processes
can be summed up as holding that “the technical is political, the
political should be democratic, and the democratic should be
participatory” (Moore, 2010a, 2010b: 793), leading to the criticism
that science studies has taken its conception of politics ‘off the
shelf’ (de Vries, 2007). More recently researchers have started to
address this criticism through studies of the nature of the political
in science governance (e.g. Braun, Herrmann, Könninger, & Moore,
2010; Braun, Moore, Herrmann, & Könninger, 2010; Brown, 2009;
Thorpe, 2010; Thorpe & Gregory, 2010). Our paper contributes to
this latter body of work. It has no normative intent; we do not
present an argument as to how science policy should be made.
Rather, we offer an analysis of how those who govern understand
that policy should be made. Our account is restricted to examining
the political rationalities underpinning science policy making and
the practices and techniques advocated for effecting good govern-
ment of this activity. We do not engage with the matter of what
happens when these techniques and practice are put into operation
e how they may meet resistance from those who are being gov-
erned, and are modiﬁed and re-shaped as other stakeholders
become involved in the actual process of making and implementing
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in a recent article that uses a similar Foucauldian-inspired approach
to our own, an analysis of science policy making that ‘does not take
the inclusion of “ethical concerns”, the recognition of plural view-
points or practices of “engaging the public” per se as challenging
established power relations’ can illuminate how these practices can
have the effect of stabilizing prior commitments rather than
exposing them to contestation (Braun, Moore et al. 2010: 513).
To analyze the practices by which established power relations
have been stabilized in the government of animal biotechnologywe
develop the concept of ‘the moral economy’. Our use of this term is
different to its use elsewhere in social studies of science. Drawing
on the work of E.P. Thompson (1993), for whom the moral
economy, grounded in the moral community, operated as an
alternative to the capitalist market economy, studies have exam-
ined how moral economies operate within scientiﬁc practice,
providing ‘systems of primarily non-economic exchange within
which scientists seek to balance their personal valuesdthe ideals of
their discipline or socio-cultural groupdagainst material and social
realities largely generated by macro-level decisions of politics and
policy’ (Atkinson-Grosjean & Fairley, 2009: 164; see also Kohler,
1999; McCray, 2000; Rasmussen, 2004). Elsewhere Daston has
presented an account that focuses on the affective dimension of the
moral economy of science (Daston, 1995). As those who have
studied the operation of moral economies within science have
noted, they can provide ‘provisional maps for navigating the messy,
contingent spaces where societal and scientiﬁc values are negoti-
ated’ (Atkinson-Grosjean & Fairley, 2009: 148). However, the focus
in such work has been on explicating the negotiation of values
within the scientiﬁc community through a system of exchange
based on a common morality. Here, we study the governance
community and look at how it is working to institute a system of
exchange of moral values.
We draw on recent work in which the moral economy has been
conceptualized as a sphere of activity in which values are traded
between nation states, as a means of meeting ‘the political need to
reconcile the promise of new health technologies with the cultural
costs of scientiﬁc advance’ (Salter & Salter, 2007: 555). Here, we
focus attention on the government of the moral economy of science
within the nation state: how is this domain deﬁned, regulated and
managed, the diverse value positions circulating within the juris-
diction of the state conﬁgured as legal or illegal tender, the
exchange rate for trading different values set, and the value pref-
erences of consumers shaped so that satisfaction of their prefer-
ences by the individual also enhances the prosperity of the state?
Our account is a case study of how these questions have been
approached in the UK during the last two decades in relation to the
governance of scientiﬁc work that mixes animal and human bio-
logical material, speciﬁcally the examples of genetically modiﬁed
animals and chimeric embryos.
Genetic modiﬁcation involves the introduction of human genes
into animals, a practice that is carried out for research into human
disease (e.g. putting human cancer genes into mice in order to
study the development of the disease) and, potentially, therapy
(producing human proteins for therapeutic use from human genes
inserted into animals). Chimeric, or interspecies, embryos are
embryos produced by taking the nucleus (containing the genetic
material) from a human cell and introducing it into an animal
oocyte from which the nuclear material has been removed. The
production of such embryos was proposed by scientists as an
alternative to the use of human embryos as a source of stem cell
material for research. Genetic modiﬁcation of animals assumed
policy prominence in the early years of this century with the
debate having its origin in the controversy surrounding genetically
modiﬁed crops. The policy discussion of chimeric embryos, whichevolved in the latter part of the century’s ﬁrst decade, had its
origins in the ﬁerce debates over human embryonic stem cell
science, themselves part of a wider history of debate about early
human life (assisted reproductive technologies, pre-implantation
genetic diagnosis and, most notably, abortion). Signiﬁcantly, UK
policy engagement with the science of GM animals and chimeric
embryos took place in the absence of any salient public disquiet,
and these debates were selected as being particularly suitable for
our study because they allow us to explore the extent to which
liberal modes of governance may enable the moral economy to
work efﬁciently in support of science. The empirical material was
gathered and analysed as follows. First, consultations were held
with UK-based scientiﬁc and bioethical experts in the ﬁeld of
animal-human biological mixing to identify the range of public
and private organisations that have contributed to the governance
debate. These included government committees (eg House of
Commons Science and Technology Committee), Research Councils
(eg BBSRC), independent regulators (eg Human Fertility and
Embryology Authority), advisory non-departmental bodies (eg
Animal Procedures Committee) and independent bodies (eg Royal
Society). Second, a desk-based survey was conducted of the UK
policy and grey literature produced by these organisations. Third,
the dominant ethical positions in the policy debate contained in
this material were identiﬁed and coded in terms of their contri-
bution to our initial theoretical understanding of the operation of
the moral economy. As the conceptual framework and organisa-
tion of the paper developed, the data was revisited and reframed
in an iterative process. Consultations were carried out in the
period July 2010 to April 2011; ethical approval for this part of the
study was obtained from the King’s College London (GGS)
Research Ethics Panel. The documentary material studied spanned
the period 1998 to 2011. Before presenting the results of this
research, we further explicate the role of a moral economy in the
governance of science.
The moral economy: ethics and the liberal government of
science
In activities addressing the relationship between science and
the public, a model of ‘public understanding’ has given way to one
of ‘public engagement’. Approaches adopting the ‘public under-
standing’ model were premised on a view of the public as lacking
requisite understanding of science, such that disputes could be
alleviated through education (The Royal Society, 1985: 10). This
‘deﬁcit model’ was much criticised by sociologists of science, who
argued that all knowledge is situated, perspectival and contingent
(eg Irwin, 1995; Irwin & Wynne, 1996; Jasanoff, 2005). Such claims
for the symmetry of knowledge were used to support arguments
that ‘lay expertise’ be brought into policy making on an equal
footing with the expertise of scientiﬁc authorities. The means to
resolve tensions, in this case, is considered to be not education of
the (deﬁcient) public, but engaging the (expert) public in dialogue
with other experts so that a consensus can be achieved.
The ‘dialogic turn’ (Irwin & Michael, 2003: x) in public under-
standing of science resonates positively with the wider ‘delibera-
tive turn’ in democratic modes of governance. It is thus
unsurprising that engagement of the public in dialogue over
science has been readily taken up by governments as a necessary
component of the policy process designed to ensure the legitimacy
of the policy outputs. Initiatives such as consensus conferences,
citizens’ juries, and public debates such as the GM Nation? debate
have become a recognised part of the policy landscape. Some form
of public engagement exercise has become de rigueur for bodies
producing reports on scientiﬁc developments intended to feed into
policy-making.
A. Harvey, B. Salter / Social Science & Medicine 75 (2012) 193e199 195Such initiatives speak to the liberal valorisation of individual
freedom. Government, from the classic liberal perspective, is
necessary to ensure individual freedoms, but should be limited to
prevent it infringing on those freedoms. It is here that the approach
to the analysis of liberal government introduced by Foucault and
developed by others may provide a fruitful perspective. Liberalism,
in this analysis, is ‘an art of governing that arises as a critique of
excessive government’ (Rose, O’Malley, & Valverde, 2006: 84). As
such, this art of governing entails a reﬂexivity on the part of the
state, a constant questioning of the proper limits of its activity. This
is not a striving to minimise government per se, but a concern that
the state might be doing too much of the governing (Dean, 2002:
41), encroaching into the domains of governance that exist outside
the apparatuses of the state and operate according to their own
heterogeneous systems of regulation.
The classic example of such an independent regulatory system is
‘the economy’. In Foucault’s analysis, liberal government takes
shape with the emergence in political thought of ‘the economy’,
a domain functioning according to fundamental natural laws, as an
autonomous sphere of rationality working outside the juridical
domain of the state (Gordon, 1991: 11). While operating autono-
mously from the state, the state, in classical liberal thought, retains
a vital role in ensuring that this domain of the economy can operate
freely: its role is ‘to create regulations that enable natural regula-
tions to work’ (Foucault, 2007: 353). More recent neo-liberal
political thought conceives of a more intimate role for the state in
the government of the economy. In Foucault’s understanding, the
key difference between classic and neo-liberal rationalities of
government is that while the former sees the market as a ‘quasi-
natural reality’ that delimits a sphere in which government cannot
act, for the latter the market is only maintained by the actions of
government (Gordon, 1991: 41).
In classical liberal thought, the ‘invisible hand’ of the market
would work to ensure that the wellbeing of the collective was
increased through the actions of individuals seeking to optimise
their own wellbeing. In neo-liberal thought, proper government is
required to ensure the co-development of individual and collective
wellbeing. Government, then, acts in the name of individual and
national prosperity (Rose, 1996: 37), and it is through ensuring
national prosperity that the security of the state is guaranteed.
According to this view, liberal government is not concerned with
the direct legitimation of political power over a territory, the aim of
sovereign rule exempliﬁed by Machiavelli’s Prince. Instead, it is
concernedwith ensuring the security (as in prosperity) of its people
so that this prosperity is not only the State’s raison d’être but also
the route by which it can ensure its continued existence (Foucault,
2000: 322; Gordon, 1991: 19). Political legitimacy is thus achieved
at one stage removed, but the operation of power is present and
constant.
A key measure of prosperity for contemporary states is their
technological capacity (Barry, 2001). A governance problem
emerges when cultural values clash, or potentially clash, with
values supportive of technological development, so threatening to
derail the smooth progress of the scientiﬁc enterprise. How can
liberal government make sure that science proceeds unimpeded
(hence ensuring the prosperity of the state and its people) without
governing too much ewithout imposing unwarranted restrictions
on the right of individuals to hold to their own moral beliefs and
hence follow their own conceptions of the good? In what follows,
we explore how, in relation to animal engineering, liberal
government, exempliﬁed by recent UK policy debates, may be able
to create a separate problem space for negotiating the clash
between scientiﬁc and cultural values, outside the realm of the
state, and how, adopting neo-liberal governmental practices, it
seeks to govern this problem space to ensure that support ofscience is maintained. This problem space is the ‘moral economy’
of science.
Constituting the legitimate elements of the moral economy
If the moral economy is to work efﬁciently as a sphere of private
governance distinct from public governance through state institu-
tions, there has to be an understanding of what value conﬂicts
should be situated in which domain. Government through the
moral economy must therefore have the ability to allocate ethical
issues accordingly and to be seen as acting legitimately in so doing.
So for example, the Animal Procedures Committee report on animal
biotechnology examines the ethical issues associated with mixing
between species, particularly mixing between human and non-
human animal, to create hybrid entities. It notes ‘the main oppo-
sition to hybridisation probably comes from those who wish to
maintain real boundaries between human and non-human, and
who retain a conviction that “kinds” are separate creations, each -
as it were - designed to embody a particular beautiful form’. It then
goes on to state ‘It is no part of our brief to take sides on so large
a metaphysical and ethical dispute’ (APC, 2001: 11).
Positioning the question of whether genetic modiﬁcation is
morally wrong because it infringes a ‘natural’ order (whether that
order is one designed by God or by Mother Nature) as ‘not one for
public policy’ is a classical liberal approach (Weale, 2001: 418).
Contemporary liberal politics holds to the principle that the state
should remain neutral on moral matters. Far from marginalising
such moral questions, positioning them as matters for individuals
to determine rather than the state to pronounce on indicates the
seriousness with which they are taken by the liberal project as
properly belonging to the autonomous realm of the moral
economy.
To position the moral economy as an autonomous realm oper-
ating according to its own laws is not to say that the state abdicates
responsibility for its operation. On the contrary, there is a require-
ment for the state to take an active role in ensuring that this domain
is free to operate unimpeded (Foucault, 2007: 353). Value positions
that challenge this principle must be managed (governed)
accordingly. Those holding an anti-vivisectionist stance, for
example, are managed in such a way that this perspective is
devalued or excluded in debates on the use of animals in science.
One strategy adopted for devaluing anti-vivisectionist perspectives
is to neutralise them through co-option. For example, the NCoB
working group on Ethics of Research Involving Animals included
a representative of the British Union for the Abolition of Vivisection
(BUAV), this representative being heavily outnumbered by repre-
sentatives from science. An abolitionist perspective was thus given
its due place under democratic principles, but the abolitionist
perspective was not allowed to gain ground. Such a practice for
‘incorporating and regulating the presence of the threatening Other
within’ allows the dominant discourse to ‘manage the demands of
marginal groups in ways that incorporate them without disturbing
the hegemony of the norms that marginalize them’ (Brown, 2008:
27, 36).
The hegemonic strategy of marginalisation through inclusion is
complemented by a parallel strategy to deal with those who chal-
lenge the rules of the moral economy itself. Radical perspectives
propounded by groups such as the Animal Liberation Front (ALF)
are excluded e indeed, exclude themselves e from participation in
the moral economy. For dealing with such groups, the state is likely
to employ the authoritarian measures that are integral to liberal
modes of government (Dean, 1996, 2002; Valverde, 1996). For the
state, the ALF has de-legitimised its claims through its tactics of
violence, so making itself a terrorist operation in the eyes of the
policy community and most of the wider policy network. In its
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Nufﬁeld Council on Bioethics working group agreed with the state
that ‘use of violence and intimidation against members of the
research community, research institutions, their business partners,
family and neighbours, or against organisations and individuals
representing animal welfare groups, is morally wrong and politi-
cally insidious’ (NCoB, 2005: 264). By using tactics that are morally
and legally wrong, the ALF places itself outside the moral economy
and, in terms of a liberal democratic approach, excludes itself from
the right to participate in the practices by which societal consensus
is established according to democratic principles.
In the government of the moral economy, authoritarian
measures are not only brought to bear to exclude those interest
groups or individuals that ‘disrupt or simply get in the way of the
establishment and maintenance of a liberal legal and political
order’ (Dean, 2002: 40)e thosewhowill not rather than cannot use
reason. They are also applied to the moral arguments that might be
enrolled, deﬁning which are legitimate for use in the moral
economy, and which are not permitted a place. In its structuring of
the moral economy, the problem for the state is not the rational
capacity of individual citizens (or the lack thereof), but the deﬁni-
tion of the proper and improper use of speciﬁc types of rationality
in speciﬁc arenas of decision-making. As the policy discussion
around animal engineering illustrates, the state is at pains to set the
standard for the relationship between the formal rationality of the
scientiﬁc domain and the operation of the moral economy:
We recognise the sincere ethical and moral concerns associated
with research of this nature and are therefore concerned that, to
respond to these concerns, any regulatory framework associated
with use of human-animal chimera or hybrid embryos in
research should be transparent and workable. We have,
however, been concerned to note that, in certain cases, the
serious ethical and moral objections to work of this nature have
been clouded through the raising of what appear at ﬁrst sight to
be scientiﬁc arguments to support such opposition but which do
not stand up to scrutiny. Some of the opposition in responses
which we received was based on hostility to science as against
Nature. In addition, some throwaway statements concerning the
scientiﬁc basis for proposed areas of research not only lack
supporting evidence butmay perhaps be better termed ‘pseudo-
science’. We are of the opinion that ethical and moral concerns
should be considered within the context in which they are
made, and that inappropriate use of science to justify ethical and
moral arguments is unhelpful. Inappropriate use of science
should be identiﬁed and disregarded by Government and other
policy-makers. (House of Commons Science and Technology
Committee, 2007: 26e27)
Establishing a linkage between the scientiﬁc and the moral
domains so that the latter becomes dependent on the rational
standards of the former is used as a basis for deﬁning the bound-
aries of the state-sponsored moral economy. Given that scientists
and analytically-trained philosophers tend to dominate the
working groups and committees producing policy-relevant mate-
rial to inform debate in the moral economy of science, it is not
surprising to ﬁnd policy documents in which the only valid moral
perspective is construed as the one that employs a narrow, tech-
nical or formal, rationality. For example, in the BBSRC’s Ethics,
Morality and Animal Biotechnology we ﬁnd the view that ‘ethical
judgements may be argued for and shown to be more or less
rational and informed’ and that while consideration of moral
concerns should be taken seriously, this is in order ‘to raise the level
of the debate and encourage judgements to be made on a rational
and considered basis’ (Straughan, 2000: 7). This is an articulation of
the perspective that any controversy is a problem of insufﬁcientinformation and poor reasoning: as Straughan has put it elsewhere,
the arguments that genetic modiﬁcation is unnatural because it
crosses species boundaries ‘do not have much ethical signiﬁcance,
resting as they do upon unclear language and unsound reasoning’
(Reiss & Straughan, 1996: 64).
The appeal to facts, derived from empirical science, and to
reason, the product of rational thought, as ultimate arbiters in
moral debate has a privileged position in policy discourses. In this
way the state acts to institute the moral economy as a regulatory
domain that, once properly established, has the potential to operate
according to its own logic, only requiring state support to ensure
the proper rules for its operation are maintained. However, the
extract from the House of Commons report on hybrid and chimeric
embryos quoted above also suggests the emergence of a supple-
mentary governance challenge for the state. While the report is at
pains to distinguish between the scientiﬁc and the moral domains,
the latter is seen as requiring serious attention in its own right.
Following recent mutations in liberal modes of government, there
is considered to be a proper role for the state in actively ‘tinkering’
with the ongoing operation of the moral economy to ensure that
the desired ends of increased prosperity are met. We now turn to
examine how the moral economy is made governable.
Practices of governing the moral economy
In its Report on Biotechnology the APC suggests that ‘If people
ﬁnd the “mixing of kinds” objectionable, nobody concerned with
public order, or the use of public funds, can disregard that objection
merely because it seems, to some, unreasonable’ (APC, 2001: 19).
For contemporary liberal rationalities of government, such atten-
tion to a governable space can be seen as bi-directional: moral
arguments are regarded as deserving of consideration by the
political institutions of the state in the formation of science policy,
and this domain of the moral economy is requiring of government
by the state in order to ensure it can operate effectively.
Central to the government of this space is the shaping of the
ethical preferences of the ‘consumer’ in the moral economy.
Engaging in dialogue with the public is viewed as a necessary part
of good government in the formulation of policies on areas of
emerging science. In the case of animal engineering, the AEBC
underpinned its report on animal biotechnology with specially
commissioned research into public attitudes (Macnaghten, 2001);
the HFEA initiated a public consultation on public attitudes towards
hybrid embryos in 2007 (HFEA, 2007); the House of Commons
Science and Technology Committee drew on this research in its
report on regulation of such embryos, and in addition held its own
public seminar, noting ‘This is the ﬁrst occasion upon which we
have held such an event and we found it to be of great value in our
deliberations’ (House of Commons Science and Technology
Committee, 2007: 7). The AMS work on ‘animals containing
human material’ includes ‘a signiﬁcant programme of public dia-
logue’ (AMS, 2009a). But this dialogue must, from the perspective
of contemporary liberal rationalities of rule, be so governed that the
outcomes demanded of good government e increased prosperity
realised through technological development e are assured. If, as
a proponent of New Labour’s policy of ‘personalisation’ has
observed, ‘a state that is committed to protecting private freedom
must also continuously shape how people use their freedom in the
name of the wider public good’ (Leadbeater, 2004: 90), the modes
of governance to achieve this happy condition are clearly central to
the liberal project.
One stance found in policy debates on genetic modiﬁcation of
animals is that of recognising that the public hold varying value
positions, and treating these as analogous to a consumer preference.
In the case of food products derived from GM animals, the
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tain consumer choice about whether to purchase meat or other
products from GM and cloned animals’ (AEBC, 2002: 38). In other
words, individuals should be able to act to satisfy their value pref-
erences, in this case literally using the (super)market to do so.
However, the issues in animal biotechnology range much further
than GM food products, with GM animals being used, or potentially
used, in a wide variety of ways. In these debates on genetic modi-
ﬁcation of animals, policy discussions correspondingly considered
that attending to public concerns was a more complex matter.
Considerable attention is paid in these discussions to research
investigating the varied value positions held by the public, estab-
lishing that diverse, and often conﬂicting, moral stances exist.
However, the difﬁcult governance question is how to move from
a knowledge of the diverse values circulating in the moral economy
to the mechanism bywhich an agreement can be reached onwhich
value positions should form the basis for public policy. There is no
‘invisible hand’ at work in the moral economy. Policy demand and
value supply do not achieve a natural equilibrium. A plethora of new
techniques for facilitating deliberative dialogue have been trialled:
consensus conferences, citizens’ juries, public debates, expert-led
workshops and so on. These have, however, proved ineffective at
producing a compromise agreement and certainly have not ach-
ieved consensus. The new tools of deliberative democracy have
proved singularly unsuccessful in creating an ideal speech situation
in which a communicative rationality can ﬂourish. Instead, as with
the GM Nation? debate, interest groups with polarised positions
have dominated despite avoidance of this phenomenon being an
explicit aim of the exercise (Irwin, 2006: 311).
If these new tools of deliberative democracy have proved
inadequate to the governance task posed by the moral economy,
then othermeansmust be sought. Given that expertise is integral to
liberal modes of government, being vital to the ‘government at
a distance’ that is its key characteristic (Miller & Rose, 1990; Rose,
1993; Rose & Miller, 1992), the use of expertise as a means for
ﬁltering competing value positions is a natural governance path to
explore. In the government of values in bioscience and biomedi-
cine, bioethical expertise, in the form of bioethics commissions,
committees and the like, has come to have a central role (Salter,
2007; Salter & Salter, 2007). The role of this ‘public bioethics’
(Kelly, 2003) is not to pronounce judgment on the moral accept-
ability of new science. For example, the Nufﬁeld Council on
Bioethics works ‘to identify and deﬁne ethical questions . with
a view to promoting public understanding and discussion’ (NCoB,
2000: 5). While eschewing a normative role, bioethical expertise
has a governmental role. It puriﬁes the ethical discourses existent
in society, reframing them in ‘proper’ language and addressing
them using ‘proper’ techniques of evaluation (Moore, 2010a,
2010b). Notably, it reconﬁgures value disputes in ways that are
amenable to formally rational debate and decision making (Evans,
2002). This does not mean that such bioethics ignores emotional
responses to scientiﬁc developments among the public. Rather, it
works to distinguish between public opinions with ‘latent ethical
potential’ (Moore, 2010a, 2010b: 207), which can be developed into
formally rational arguments that can engage with the moral
economy and those founded on prejudice which are invalid
currency and cannot.
When competing values are in circulation, then, the role of
bioethical expertise in the government of the moral economy is as
interpreter. But where there is a potential ethical issue but not yet
open controversy a further strategy is required to shape the
emerging value preferences of consumers. In the case of GM crops
a classical liberal approach saw resolution as a matter of individual
consumers satisfying their (pre-existing) value preferences through
the market. However, in the area of animal engineering, there is anabsence of any pre-existing ethical ‘controversy’; as the AMS notes,
there is an ‘apparent gulf between current and future scientiﬁc
practices, and public awareness’ in this area (AMS, 2009b: 3). The
task of governing is not to mediate between different deeply held
beliefs, trying to ﬁnd a resolution to the controversy that is
acceptable to all. It is instead to pre-empt controversy by identifying
and dealing with potential ethical tensions. The state’s approach to
this practice of anticipatory governance is a neo-liberal one char-
acterised by the active attempt to shape themoral economy through
the promotion of certain value preferences over others.
This shaping of value preferences is accomplished through the
judicious provision of information. In the public engagement
exercises undertaken on the topic of animal engineering, ensuring
the public have information not only on the science and its uses but
also on the ethical import of that science has been considered vital.
For example, as a basis for its consultation on inter-species
embryos, the HFEA produced a document ‘which explained some
of the social and ethical arguments for and against the research’
(HFEA, 2007: 4.5). The AMS, in its call for a contractor to carry out
the public engagement element of its project on animals containing
human material, considered that it would be necessary for the
contractor to provide participants with information such as ‘what
scientiﬁc knowledge, andmedical beneﬁts, have resulted from such
research; how animals containing humanmaterial might be used in
future research, and what knowledge or medical beneﬁts are
anticipated’ (AMS, 2009b: 8). One could interpret this emphasis on
providing information as a return to a deﬁcit model, with education
a necessary precondition for rational decision-making by the
public. However, the consultations set out to do rather more than
provide information, in terms of ensuring that those taking part in
discussion have the scientiﬁc literacy to understand what is
involved in animal engineering. They also stress the importance of
setting out the arguments for and against the science, as a prereq-
uisite for ‘meaningful engagement’.
In this, the provision of information can be seen as part of
a strategy for ‘mobilising the consumer’ (Miller & Rose, 1997) in the
moral economy. Miller and Rose examined how the subject of
consumption of consumer goods has been assembled by matching
the desires of the individual with the outputs of the productive
machine, in part by bringing those desires into being through the
work of charting them (Miller & Rose, 1997: 31). In the moral
economy, governmental practices seek to match the ethical values
of the individual with the outputs of the scientiﬁc machine, in part
by bringing those value positions into being through the various
techniques of public engagement with ethical issues in science.
Public engagement initiatives do not use tactics as crude as
listing the potential ethical positions and enticing participants to
choose from them. Rather, they identify areas of potential ethical
tension that should be investigated. For example, the AMS indi-
cated to those tendering for its public dialogue programme that
areas to be explored might include ‘where are particular sensitiv-
ities (e.g. around particular tissues - reproductive, or neural tissue;
or species e.g. primates, domestic animals)’ (AMS, 2009b: 9). In this
way the debate is pre-framed in terms that have been set out by
bioethical expertise which has highlighted these elements (mixing
of brains, mixing between human and non-human primate, use of
human embryonic stem cell derived material in animals) as of
particular sensitivity (Greely, 2003; Greene et al., 2005). Bioethical
expertise is the authority that deﬁnes the debate, and hence policy,
agenda.
With the debate deﬁned by bioethical expertise, another form of
expertise, that of science, comes back into play in shaping theway it
develops. In public engagement activities, there is a leading role for
scientists in determining what information the public is given
about the science. For example, the AMS emphasises that in its
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by the Contractor in close consultation with the Working Group’
(AMS, 2009b: 9) which is largely (though not exclusively) scientists.
The HFEA exercise included ‘deliberative work’ in which ‘expert
speakers were used to illustrate the different issues and arguments
relating to the consultation, thereby stimulating questions and
debate’ the aim being to ‘explore how the views and opinions of
participants changed when exposed to different information’
(HFEA, 2007: 4.9). The provision of information by experts speaking
to existing value positions is used to steer the value positions
developed in members of the lay public.
Expertise plays a central role in acting on individual subjects to
bring into being new ethical preferences, so preparing both ‘the
market for the product and the product for the market’ (Thorpe &
Gregory, 2010: 273). It is employed as a strategy for developing
individual’s ethical views in such a way that they are in support of
the science. The consultation exercisesmay be at pains to be neutral
and even-handed in presenting information, offering arguments
both for and against the science. But by invoking ‘health’ as an
outcome of the science, they are tapping into the pre-existingmoral
discourse in which health is a meta-value the invoking of which
legitimates other discourses and practices (Greco, 2004). Consul-
tation exercises may list an equal number of pros and cons, but each
point does not carry equal weight in the moral economy: an
argument for the science justiﬁed in terms of health improvement
is likely to outweigh several arguments against the science.
Whether this strategy is successful, or whether individuals
successfully resist the shaping of their ethical preferences in this
fashion, is a matter for further empirical research. However, by
suggesting that the science will satisfy the consumer preference for
health (including setting out both the medical beneﬁts that have
arisen and those that are anticipated (AMS, 2009b: 8)) the bringing
into being of value positions supporting the science is facilitated
while the articulation of value positions that speak against the
science is deterred.
Conclusion
The way the UK debate over interspecies embryos was managed
at the level of policy agenda setting illustrates the success of liberal
arts of government of the moral economy of animal engineering.
The proposals by scientists to introduce human nuclear material
into enucleated animal oocytes to create stem cells for research did
not ignite pre-existing moral debates e other than to draw in those
opposed to any form of embryo research. Indeed, the main oppo-
sition to the research came from the Government of the day, which
proposed fairly restrictive legislation, in part on the assumption
that the public would be opposed to such technology, an assump-
tion that one observer described as being based on ‘the ﬁndings of
a ﬂawed public consultation dominated by self-selecting oppo-
nents of embryo research’ (Henderson, in Watts, 2009: 17).
However, elsewhere in the machinery of the state, the stance was
very much in favour of allowing the creation of interspecies
embryos (House of Commons Science and Technology Committee,
2007; Joint Committee on the Human Tissue and Embryos (Draft)
Bill, 2007). With scientists proactive in promoting the potential
beneﬁts of the research in terms of human health (Watts, 2009),
and the media on board (Williams et al., 2009), the value positions
of the public could be brought into alignment with the demands of
government. The consultation by the Human Fertilisation and
Embryology Authority concluded that the majority of the public
wanted to understand what was proposed and why scientists
wanted to do it, and these people tended to shift from an instinctive
‘yuck’ response to acceptance or support of creating chimeric
embryos (HFEA, 2007).We should not neglect other facets of the government of
interspecies embryos that pre-dated and preceded its government
through the moral economy. It was only a chance remark by
a scientist in a press conference that drew media attention to the
possibility of this work being undertaken in UK research labs (Fox,
in Watts, 2009: 22). Without this inadvertent intervention, it is
likely that the production of human/animal chimeric embryos
would have been governed as a technical matter, within the
existing policies and practices pertaining to the research. When
the debate did emerge into the public domain, it was circum-
scribed by the authoritarian measures integral to liberal govern-
ment. Thus, when the HFEA consultation received a ‘large
number’ of responses from those who were opposed to any type
of embryo research, its approach was to ‘distinguish those
objecting to the fundamental notion of using human embryos in
research, from other respondents, to explore where others might
impose limits’ (HFEA, 2007: 5.2), excluding the former from
consideration.
In the matter of animal engineering, we have shown how the
debate is structured by bioethical expertise, regulating the currency
of the moral economy, and how the way the debate plays out is
shaped by combined bioethical and scientiﬁc expertise, ensuring
that the preferences of consumers in the moral economy are such
that the satisfaction of these preferences by individuals also
satisﬁes the aims of government. It is through the combination of
these various elements of liberal government that the desires of the
populace are brought into alignment with the will of the state. This
is not an imposition by the state of its will on a populace against
their interests for government is a form of pastoral power,
a government of all and of each (Foucault, 2000). From the
perspective of policy makers, by employing these practices of
government, the wellbeing of the individual is enhanced as the
security of the state is increasede animal engineering is conﬁgured
as a technology that can improve both individual and population
health, the knowledge generated is understood as both an indi-
vidual and a social good, and the economic beneﬁts are presented
as accruing both to individual citizens and to the national economy
in the form of increased competitiveness. Nor is this government
the meticulously ordered implementation of a centrally planned
programme. The various activities of governing have coherence
within the context of a particular governmental rationality e
a governmental rationality being the more or less coherent way of
thinking about how government should be practised, on what or
whom, by whom, and towhat ends (Gordon, 1991:3) e but they are
not reducible to that rationality.
Analysing the government of animal engineering as a liberal
practice allows for a more nuanced understanding than that
developed in much social science analysis of science governance.
Social scientists have been disappointed with recent initiatives to
develop science policy making so that it engages with the wider
public, complaining that they have failed to be fully inclusive,
engaging only a limited number of viewpoints, in a way that
undermines any claims that the consensus reached is properly
democratic (Horlick-Jones et al., 2006; Irwin, 2001, 2006; Rowe
et al., 2005). Our analysis suggests this is not the failure of
a democratic politics but the success of a liberal mentality of rule.
Liberalism has demonstrated again its ﬂexibility in adapting to
meet new governance challenges, in this case the challenge of
public opposition to science. Science may be too important to be
left to the scientists, but it is also too important to be left to the
public. For the state, the bringing into being of the moral economy
and the development of techniques for governing that economy is
proving effective in ensuring that its aspirations for enhancing
individual and collective prosperity through enhanced technolog-
ical capacity are assured.
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